The Great Indian Offensive; january and february 1865
Background
All the way from summer 1864 till 1869 North American Great Plains were a battleground between white men and plains indians. Many famous events happened during that war, like so called Fetterman massacre, "battle" of Washita and massacre in Sand Creek. How ever one of the most worrying periods for the US government was during the beginning of 1865, when continuous attacks from indians kept the Overland Trail practically in their hands for a full month. This huge attack surprised the army complitely in a worst possible time, and there were even mentions that whole Colorado might have to be evacuated, because it was impossible to supply food for the people.
The Great War of the plains had started in spring 1864. The reasons were numerous. In the end the war was most likely inevitable, since white settlements were steadily advancing from Kansas and Nebraska to the Plains, and from Colorado towards east. Also more and more traffic moved in Santa Fe and Overland Trail in the early 1860s. This meant that plains indians were quickly loosing their hunting-grounds and the game was becaming rare because whites drove it away or hunted it down. Especially southern cheyennes, cheyenne dogsoldiers and southern arapahoes were in trouble since they had lost most of their best lands to the whites. This led to a famine, and indians were forced to rob from white settlers to feed their families. This had gone on for some time, but during the civil war regular troops were removed to fight in the civil war, and local voluntary units were raised as a replacements. Regular troops had been quite inpartial towards native americans, but new local troops hated indians, and seek to use the situation as their advantage, to get rid of the indians. In the same time central government could not give lot`s if attention to the plains, so local leaders were quite free to follow their own policies. Especially in Colorado governor John Evans and military leader, colonel Chivington, were actively hostile towards indians. Their troops provoked indians into a war, which started during spring 1864. In summer indians looted in the western routes, especially during august. For a while routes between Colorado territory and rest of the country were cut.
The army under general Curtis, commander of the department of Kansas, retaliated in september, sending strong cavalry and militia units to hunt hostile (and also friendly) indians. They were how ever unsuccesfull, but army was planning to transport even more cavalry units to the plains. In the meantime cheyennes and arapahoes started to want peace. After negotiations some of them moved to Fort Lyon and surrendered to the army.
Army was moving more troops to the plains to hunt indians, and the commanders didn`t want peace. Army operations how ever were stopped by the invasion of confederate general Sterling Price. With as many as 15 000 horsemen Price invaded Missouri, and then advanced against Kansas border. General Curtis was forced to move all available troops to stop the invasion. This included both 16th Kansas cavalry and 2nd Colorado cavalry, which were preparing to march to the plains. Also main body of 1th Colorado cavalry left the plains to repel enemy assault. It took whole october and november to beat Price and drive his troops back to Arkansas. During this time main military force in Colorado was 3rd Colorado cavalry, which was a 100 days volunteer unit. Against any common sense colonel Chivington of Colorado used this unit to attack surrendered indians near Fort Lyon. In this massacre of Sand Creek some 120 cheyenne and arapaho indians were killed. This massacre was the thing which finally destroyed the hope for peace in the plains. It united the plains indians into a war against whites. At first everything was peacefull after the massacre. Indians vanished, hiding from the army. They were how ever getting reinforcements from the north, from powerfull lakota tribes, and former divide between peace and war factions was over. All were now united in hostility against the whites. It would remain to be seen what would come out from this new alliance.
The alliance was formed in the worst possible time for the army. This makes Chivington`s action even more foolish. The 3rd Colorado cavalry was dismissed in late december 1865, since it was only 100-days unit. This left in Santa Fe Trail only some companies of 1th Colorado cavalry, and some units of 3rd Wisconsin cavalry in Kansas. Overland trail was a bit better protected, 11th Ohio cavalry being around and west from Fort Laramie, 7th Iowa cavalry east from Laramie, and 1th Nebraska cavalry in the same area. They were how ever thinly spread along the long route, and some areas were badly defended. The most badly defended are was the valley of southern fork of the Platte river. After 3rd Colorado was dismissed the area was virtually undefended. This was the most vulnerable place for an attack, and it was also an important area since supply line to Colorado went through the route as well as the overland stage-route. The area was inviting an attack, and that is what it received.
When january 1865 started, 2nd Colorado and main force of the 1th Colorado, as well as 11th Kansas cavalry were all marching to the plains. Nebraska cavalry battalion was also coming, as well as a bit later 16th Kansas cavalry and two regiments of Galvanized Yankees. In the beginning of the year these units were how ever still far from Colorado. Simultaniously the commander of Colorado was changed. Chivington`s period of service ended, and he was replaced by colonel Thomas Moonlight of the 11th Kansas cavalry.
The Indians Attack Platte Valley
What area does Southern Platte Valley contain? It is the area roughly from Latham, Colorado, to Cottonwood. Fort Laramie is somewhat north from the valley, but in a good supporting distance. In the beginning of january 1865 there were two main forts in the area. Cottonwood was in the western Nebraska, between Fort Laramie and Fort Kearny. It had a strong garrison of two companies from 1th Nebraska cavalry and 7th Iowa cavalry. Already in Colorado was Julesburg, or also called Fort Rankin. It had only a small garrison of one company, but the importance of Julesburg was in it being a supply base for smaller military bases between Latham and Cottonwood. Along the stage-coach route small garrisons had been scattered to protect the mail-stations. The who route was thinly manned and there were no reserves in hand in case something would happen.
In early 1865 some army officers were deeply concerned about the situation. Indians had not been sighted for some time. Captain Theo Conkey from Fort Zarah, on Santa Fe Trail, reported that indians were on Arkansas-river and moving in large groups towards north. He also believed that the recent quietness was just a calm before a great explosion. Captain Conkey was absolutely right!
Many didn`t believe in the warnings. Indians seemed to be on the run after terrible massacre in Sand Creek and more regiments were marching to the plains. Colonel Moonlight made it Denver city in 4. january and took command in district of Colorado. How ever the regiment that was promised to him, 11th Kansas cavalry, had just started from eastern Kansas and was far away. It would not make it in time. In seventh of january a strong indian attack started against Overland Trail. It was so strong effort from the indians, that what took place could be called an offensive. It was no longer a typical small raid indians had used to make. The attack surprised soldiers almost complitely, in a situation where southern Platte Valley was almost defenseless. Indians attacked against they customs during winter, which tells how angry they were. Sand Creek had united plains indians, and they were ready to change their customs and fight in large groups and during winter.
First report about what was happening came from colonel Moonlight in 7. january. "Indians attacked a train in Valley Station; burned. Killed 12 men. Attacked a train in Julesburg. Were driven off. Two killed in both sides. In re-inforcements are not send from Kearny, Lyon or some other place, people must starve. Immense excitement. I have no-one to re-inforce anyone". That tells well what was happening. Already in the first day of the attack Moonlight was forced to ask for help from other districts, since he had no troops himself. Two days later general Curtis reported to general Halleck, who was chief os staff of the U.S. army. Perhaps as many as 1500 indians had attacked mail-stations in Platte route. There had been a furious battle. Colonel Summers and major O`Brien had been in command, and indians were finally repulsed. Soldiers had lost 15 men, indians about 30, including leading chief. This was a strange report, and it almost positively is about battle of Julesburg, and contains some false information. But I will deal with Julesburg a bit later. Main attack seemed to be around Julesburg and Valley station.
The attack continues through the whole january. In fifth of january colonel Livingston from Nebraska wrote to district headquarters and listed the depredations in the area after 14. january. He reported in his area 10 differen attacks, in which seven whites had been killed and three were missing. Livingston claimed that 23 indians had died. Five ranched had been burned, as well as two mail-stations, other one which was Julesburg in 28. of january. All the cattle in the area had been stolen, 1500 heads in all. Indians had taken a government train of 22 wagons. In Valley Station indians had burned all government hay, making it almost impossible to operate the mail-line. Twenty soldiers had chased the indians who had burned the hay, but had met superior force and barely managed to escape back to Valley Station. The indians were attacking in unseen numbers, and small military units were in danger of being annihilated. The mail-line came into a complite stop. Livingston failed to report about the attacks before 14. of january, as well as about many other attacks during that period he was talking about.
The overall lossed to the white settlers were severe. In some books it is said that indians killed many more than had lost in Sand Creek (120). How many they killed is how ever not certain.
Julesburg - Almost a major victory
The most shocking event for the whites during january was the first battle of Julesburg. This battle is probably also the one which colonel Summers, of 7th Iowa cavalry, was supposed to have led. General R. B. Mitchell, commander of the district of Nebraska, reported in eight of january to general Curtis. His report included telegrams from captain N. O` Brien and colonel Livingston. First telegram was from captain O`Brien, of 7th Iowa cavalry, who was commanding Fort Rankin in Julesburg. It was dated eight of january. "I have had a desperate fight (indians went south). Will report in few minutes". Another telgram was from Livingston. He made a remark that situation was threatening. Military bases should be concentraced or strenghtened. Many at the moment were too weak to even defend against the odds now threatening. "Indians are the masters of Overland Trail, and we must act immediately". To this general Mitchell added that he would move to the front lines from Omaha as soon as possible.
So there had been a desperate fight in Julesburg. But what was the correct date for it? Captain O`Brien`s telegram was dated eight of january, but as we shall see, the battle was actually fought a day before. The date of the telegram therefore remains a total mystery, as well as the earlier report about a fight between colonel Summers and indians.
The answer to what exactly happened in Julesburg is to be found from the monthly returns from U.S. Military posts.
In the returns Fort Rankin is called Fort Sedgwick. About january captain O`Brien has written the following. There were present two officers and 67 men, all from company F, 7th Iowas cavalry. Captain O`Brien was another one of the officers, so there is no rooms for colonel Summers and major O`Brien, captains brother, being there. Therefore there has either been another battle which I have not seen a report, or the report given to Halleck was mistaking. Five of the men were sick (one had died), and several scouting patrols had been send. In "remarks" O`Brien had written. "Company has lost men in battle against a large warparty of indians. Battle started 7.00 am, january 7th and continued till 2.00 pm. Scouting patrols were out, so the post had only 37 men fit for duty. Indians numbered from twelve to fifteen hundred. Company fled the field, abandoning woundeds".
It was a strange battle indeed, 37 soldiers attacking more than 1000 indians. There is how ever an explanation. Indians made an attack to the train near Julesburg during that same day. This obviously was meant to lure the soldiers out, which they did, coming to help the train. Soldiers were drawn into an ambush, and they only made it out because some young warriors attacked too early, when the soldiers were still in a position to get away. If indians had had better discipline, all 37 soldiers would have been killed. Now they were able to flee back to Fort Rankin in confusion, leaving their woundeds to be slaughtered. Indians did not attack the fort, because it was so totally against they customs.
There has been a small confusion about the losses of the F company in Julesburg. Some books have claimed as many as 42 as dead, while most have agreed that 14 soldiers were killed. The 42 is obviously too high, since O`Brien himself said he only had 37 men to began with. Number 14 is almost precise, but not quite. In the company rolls 14 dead have been reported, and most scholars have taken the number from there. How ever there was also in the battle one unassigned recruit of the regiment, which was not member of F company, and therefore does not show on the company rolls. He was killed too, and exact number is therefore 15, and also two slightly wounded men. Four civilians were killed with the soldiers. The casualty list was as follows.
Killed in battle of Julesburg, 7. january 1865:
Sergeant A. Blanchett
Corporal A. Keene
Corporal W. Jalestt (?)
Corporal W. H. Grey
Privates:
G. Bennett
A. Brundage
(?). Ball
D. Lalmson
J. Gordon
D. Liffincett
E. Moore
unknown (name was unreadable)
J. Stebbins
T. Scott
These from company F, and also
J. M. Price, recruit not yet numbered with service.
Wounded men were privates Buell and Samuel S. Woodruff. They were slightly wounded, thrown from their horses.
The indians had started their offensive with an impressive attack against Julesburg, defeating the garrison and almost destroying it. The route of the soldiers must have been complite, because the wounded were abandoned. It tells a lot about the shock of Nicholas O`Brien that he admitted so freely that it had happened.
Valley Station in the middle of it all
Another central place in the Platte valley was Valley Station. When the attack started unhappy lieutenant Newkirk was commanding the garrison. Apparently he had send rather panicky message to the headquarters, since Moonligh answered in 9. january;
" Troops are en route to you. Remain, and have people do so". Re-inforcements were truly on their way towards Valley Station, though not too many of them. In fact Moonlight had lied a bit, since he had a reserved, and he was now sending all of it to Valley Station. Immediately in seventh of january Moonlight had send his whole reserve to there. This reserve was company C of 1th Colorado cavalry. It was commanded by lieutenant J. J. Kennedy and had about 60 men. This was Moonlight`s entire reserve! Kennedy was supposed to escort a supply train to Valley Station and then remain there.
Situation didn`t look too good for the whites, and Moonlight didn`t hesitate to tell it to his superiors in department headquarters. He reported that situation was serious. Indians had attacked Julesburg, Valley Station and several other places in Overland Trail. Overland Trail was now in their hands, and Moonlight didn`t have anyone to send in. He couldn`t even defend the ranches, which were burned one by one. "As you probably know, all the food to this country must be brought from Missouri river, and if troops are not send to protect the supply trains, there is only one way to save the people from starvation: to abandon this land which is a source of wealth to United States". Moonlight was desperate enough to already mention evacuation.
Lieutenant Kennedy was in the middle of it all, marching to Valley Station. He reached the post in 14. january. Simultaniously his rear-guard and several trains came under attack. Also American ranch and Wisconsin Ranch nearby were burning. Kennedy took 12 men and went to help Wisconsin ranch, and managed to save the inhabitants. The ranch was destroyed. There were about 400 indians, and fighting lasted the whole day. All people in American ranch were killed. Kennedy reported that eight whites had been killed as well as 15 indians. Also in separate fight one white had been killed and one wounded. Kennedy doesn`t mention how many men he lost as wounded, but later he mentioned that he did have wounded, so at least some. Kennedy was in deep trouble since he also had several men sick. Some soldiers were wounded 12 miles downstream, and many more in Valley Station. Situation seemed to be rather chaotic.
During the same day that Valley Station was attacked, Moonlight had managed to get another company as a reserve. This was a company from 2nd Colorado cavalry under command of 2nd lieutenant A. Walter. They received an order to march to Julesburg and then back to Junction, Colorado. The purpose of this move was probably to drive indians away from the trail and to give some support to the beleguered garrisons in Julesburg and Valley Station. Walter met indians several time during the march. His pickets were fired at etc. January 22. Walter reached Julsburg, and was send to chase indians who had stolen lot`s of cattle in the area. Some cattle was recovered, but during the search three soldiers went missing, probably killed by indians. Walter visited Valley Station in 27. january, and left the next day. On the route he how ever received an urgent message from lieutenant Kennedy to come back to his aid, since Valley Station was attacked by some 200 indians. When Walter reached Valley Station, indians had pulled out with 600 heads of cattle. Both companies gave chase, and managed to get back 200 heads of cattle. Walter lost three men wounded, and companies were forced to return to Valley Station. After the battle Walter marched back to Junction.
Re-inforcements are coming
Situation was serious, and army was hastening new regiments to the front. Simultaniously general Curtis was replaced by general G. Dodge. The 2nd Colorado was first to arrive. In 16. of january it had reached Fort Riley, and one battalion was forwarded to Fort Zarah. Main body of the colorado troops was kept in Santa Fe Trail though it was Overland Trail which was in the hands of indians. Simultaniously in Nebraska general R. B. Mitchell had managed to gather some troops and marched against indians, but he went south instead of southern Platte valley. Right next to 2nd Colorado 11th Kansas started to arrive to the central plains. Originally it was meant to go to Colorado, but not it was ordered to stay in Santa Fe Trail. This was really strange since main battles were in Overland Trail. Both regiments were spread along the trail, instead of being used to hit the indians who were attacking Julesburg and Valley Station. In february 3. indians attacked again Julesburg. Unhappy captain O`Brien and his garrison of 50 men was surrounded. Julesburg Mail-station was burned, as well as several other buildings. Indians how ever did not attack the fort. There were at least 1500 indians. In the same time strong force was attacking Alkali station some 50 miles east, preventing garrison in there coming to O`Brien`s aid.
This was a well planned attack from indians, but O`Brien was now so carefull that no major battle was fought. In next day re-inforcements reached Julesburg and garrison was saved. Army was also sending help to Overland trail. 16th Kansas cavalry was send in 8. january to concentrade on Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and then march to Fort Kearny to help general Mitchell. Regiment was how ever badly scattered, and it took time to gather it. In the beginning of february also 11th Kansas cavalry received orders to march to Fort Kearny to be used against indians in Platte valley.
So army was finally sending strong troops to attack indians in Platte valley. They were how ever late. Second attack against Julesburg had meant an end to the offensive, and indians started to move north, seeking sanctuary from Powder River valley. Most of the arapahoes and cheyennes, as well as southern oglalas and brules, and their allies from north, were marching north to join their relatives in Powder River. Heavy forces of the army would come too late and not meet any indians at all.
Battle of Mud Spring
So indians were moving south and would not meet the soldiers send against them. How ever they would meet the soldiers already stationed along the northern fork of Platte river. In 4. february first indians were already reaching Platte river, and some were attacking a telegraph station in Mud Springs. Nine soldiers and five civilians were defending, but instead of just taking the station indians had stolen animals and skirmished. Colonel Collins send 36 men of H company, 11th Ohio cavalry, from Fort Laramie to help. Company reached Mud Springs in next day. Simultaniously Collins gathered a stronger force and went to their aid. He had 120 men with him, including captain Fouts and company D from 7th Iowa cavalry. Collins went ahead with 25 men, and reached Mud Springs 6. february. Captain Fouts and the rest of the troops came next day.
Indians around Mud Springs looked determined, and after Collins had arrived they attacked with strenght. About 200 indians took positions in nearby rocks and fired at the soldiers. Some soldiers were wounded from arrows, so indians had to be dislodged. Soldiers charged and indians retreated to the surrounding hills. Seven soldiers were wounded during 7. february. There were all in all from 500 to 1000 indians, and Collins claimed that some 30 were casualties. In early 8. february lieutenant W. H. Brown with a howitzer arrived from Fort Laramie. Indians had in the mean time pulled out, and Collins went in pursuit with most of the troops. The conduct of indians during the first phase of the fight was curious. They let two rather small detachments of soldiers to reach Mud Springs, while they could have tried to destroy them one by one. Perhaps in that early stage of the fight there were not enough indians present, since more were coming all the time from the south. Most likely indians just wanted to steal the animals from Mud Springs, and when soldiers arrived they had to stay to protect their families who were just nearing Platte river on their way north. But in their passivity indians lost a great opportunity. At least lieutenant Brown`s unit should have been annihilated, but instead he was allowed to enter Mud Springs without opposition.
Now indians were running north and colonel Collins was following. In northern Platte valley Collins saw the indians again. They had crossed Platte to the northern shore, and families were now in safety. This meant that indians were ready to fight, though the best opportunity was already lost. Some 2000 warriors recrossed the river and attacked soldiers. Collins corralled his wagons and took shelter. Heavy skirmish followed. Sometimes soldiers had to attack to removed indians from some good position, but mostly they just hid behind the wagons. In one sortie the troops were attacked by some 150 indians and two soldiers were killed. Fighting lasted whole day, and in the next morning, 9. february, skirmishing continued with some 400 indians. Soon indians withdraw and Collins returned to his base without attempting anything more. He was most likely just happy that had survived the biggest fight in the plain so far without serious losses. Yhteensä 3 sotilasta sai surmansa ja 29 haavoittui. Mutta sotilaiden olisi voinut käydä paljon huonomminkin. Mud Springs ended the great indian offensive, and gave a serious warning to the soldiers. In the spring fighting would continue, and last for many years. But never again would indians manage to surprise soldiers so complitely or would be able to fight offensive war with such a strong numbers.